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Abstract
This article argues that the corporatist narrative of governance in Singapore is 
losing narrative rationality due primarily to large-scale immigration to Singa-
pore. The real or perceived threat from such immigrants has galvanized Singa-
poreans from different ethnic groups such that a strong Singaporean identity has 
emerged. As a result, the once strict artiﬁcial differences required for the corpora-
tist narrative to be believable, that is, its narrative rationality, are being gradually 
eroded. The People's Action Party (PAP) will have to either repair the narrative 
rationality of corporatism or develop an alternative one that is more relevant 
in order to continue its narrative dominance of the political space in Singapore.
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Introduction
The existing national narrative of governance portrays Singapore as a 
racially and religiously divided society where harmony has prevailed 
due to the actions of a determined and neutral government. This nar-
rative of governance is customarily described in the social sciences as 
corporatism, and it denotes a form of governance in which the state is 
exclusively responsible for legitimating and enfranchising group and 
individual participation in public affairs, while also being responsible 
for managing the harmonious interaction between such groups and indi-
viduals. This has been a key tenet of the 'Singapore Story',1 which holds 
that despite communal tensions in the 1950s and 1960s, Singapore, under 
the stewardship of the People's Action Party (PAP) has successfully cre-
ated and maintained inter-communal harmony through its policies.2 As 
such, corporatism in Singapore is operationalized through 'governing 
through difference', whereby citizens are segmented through artiﬁcial 
differences in order to discipline the manner in which the political and 
social landscape is understood and managed by the political elites. 
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This article critically analyses the corporatist narrative of govern-
ance in Singapore and argues that it is losing narrative rationality. 
Narrative rationality, that is, a narrative's 'believability', is being 
eroded through large-scale immigration to Singapore. The inﬂux of 
immigrants reduces the strict artiﬁcial differences required for the 
corporatist narrative to be relevant. The loss of narrative rationality is 
signiﬁcant as it could jeopardize continued rule by the PAP. The PAP 
will therefore either have to repair the narrative rationality of corpo-
ratism or seek an alternative narrative that is more relevant in order 
to maintain the party's narrative dominance of the political space in 
Singapore in the long run.
The article is divided into three broad sections. In the ﬁrst section, 
corporatism as a form of governance as well as a narrative is discussed. 
While 'corporatism' has been used predominantly to describe a particu-
lar strategy of economic management by the state, this article employs 
the term in its previous form where it is used to denote the attempt 
to shift Gesellschaft communities to the more harmonious Gemeinschaft 
variant (Schmitter 1974; Wiarda 1981; Williamson 1989). In contrast to 
traditional liberal politics, where politics is organized in the interest 
of individuals or classes, corporatist politics in Singapore is premised 
upon a narrative where enlightened elites manage a fractious racial 
and religious mass/mess that makes up Singaporean society. With this 
type of governance, continued rule by elites is legitimized through the 
maintenance of social harmony. 
In the second section, the impact of large-scale immigration on the 
corporatist narrative is analysed. Through the use of Walter Fisher's 
narrative paradigm, this section will demonstrate how the narra-
tive rationality of governance in Singapore can be critically assessed 
through its narrative coherence and narrative ﬁdelity. Through the 
employment of Fisher's notion of testing narrative rationality, the au-
thors argue that Singapore's corporatist narrative may be scuttled by 
an alteration to empirical reality in Singapore, as the racial divisions 
that corporatism seeks to manage are becoming increasingly indistinct. 
As such, the narrative of governance may be less convincing than it 
once was—a situation that would have signiﬁcant bearing on the way 
Singapore is governed. The ﬁnal section brieﬂy examines how the PAP 
is addressing the issue and suggests some alternative approaches for 
consideration.
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Corporatism in Singapore
Singapore has been described as a 'paternalist state', a 'developmental 
state', a 'semi-authoritarian state', an 'electoral authoritarian regime' and 
a 'corporatist state' by many scholars and analysts (Chua 1995; Low 2001; 
Case 2011; Fukuyama 1995; Means 1998; Vasu 2012). Out of these vari-
ous characterizations, corporatism is arguably more accurate as it takes 
into account the foundational role multiculturalism plays in governance 
in Singapore. Paternalism, semi-authoritarianism and electoral au-
thoritarianism focus mainly on the authority of the state in governance. 
Paternalism is, by and large, interested in the relationship between the 
state and its people en masse, while semi-authoritarianism and electoral 
authoritarianism are generally concerned with the 'less than democratic 
tactics' (Chua 1995: 204) employed by the government to control dissent 
and maintain authoritarian rule by 'adorning it with greater legitima-
tion' (Case 2011: xiv). As for the concept of the developmental state, its 
primary focus, when applied to Singapore, is the role of government 
(and government-linked corporations) in advancing economic growth. 
Hence, these characterizations do not take into account the important 
role played by the determined fostering of inter-communal difference 
to support a particular form of governance.
It is important here to highlight that while the contemporary use of 
corporatism as a concept has predominately been to describe a particu-
lar strategy of economic management by the state, this article employs 
the term in its older, original form. In its traditional form, corporatism 
describes the attempt to transform society from one where society is 
maintained by individual self-interest (Gesellschaft) to one where societal 
mores and beliefs restrain individuals (Gemeinschaft). Hence, the term is 
deployed here to capture the attempt to shift Gesellschaft communities 
to the more harmonious Gemeinschaft variant. 3
Corporatism, while a mode of governance, can be understood as a nar-
rative of governance as well. Hence, the mode of governance (corporat-
ism) and the narrative of governance (the story that makes corporatism 
intelligible) are two sides of the same coin. Expressed differently, for 
governance in such a form to take place, it requires a narrative for this 
form of governance to be both intelligible and supported. In the case of 
corporatism, a society has to believe a narrative that it is indeed plagued 
by Gesellschaft disunity, and therefore requires enlightened steerage to 
arrive at Gemeinschaft unity. Understanding the intimate relationship 
between modes of governance and narratives of governance is not new. 
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It is commonly acknowledged that a useful technique employed to create 
a common purpose among members of a society is the development of a 
narrative. Narratives carry much potency 'because they possess an inter-
nal coherence for their intended audiences that connects them to grand, 
deeply culturally embedded views of history…[which they can]…read-
ily understand, identify with, or feel little need to question' (Halverson, 
Goodall and Corman 2011: 13). For this reason narratives have been used 
for political purposes such as generating social cohesiveness within a 
newly established state or mobilizing support for a leader or political 
party against a real or perceived threat. As Ernest Koh observes:
There is a simple arc to all national narratives. As creation stories, they 
occlude, submerging heterogeneity and reducing the reality of multifarious, 
plural pasts into ﬁctitious, common histories. They tell of heroes and leaders, 
convey important decisions and moments, and create legitimacy for the 
empowered. This is particularly true for postcolonial societies, where 
divided pre-colonial loyalties need to be reconﬁgured and reconciled with 
new postcolonial allegiances. (Koh 2010: 1)
Existing research and scholarship have demonstrated that 'stories are 
universally basic to conversation and meaning making', and 'humans 
appear to have a readiness, from the beginning of life, to hear and un-
derstand stories' (see, for instance Read and Miller 1995). According to 
narrative psychology, stories are the most efﬁcient and natural way to 
communicate, especially when communicating about others (see, for 
example, Bruner quoted in Dautenhahn 2002: 103).  Humans' penchant 
for stories and storytelling may be, arguably, due to their biology that has 
evolved over time (Dautenhahn 2002). Notwithstanding, communicating 
through storytelling, that is, the act of narration, is a highly effective and 
efﬁcient way to enable human beings to: 1) make sense of the events of 
everyday life; 2) connect new information to old existing information; 
and 3) justify their resulting actions (Halverson et al. 2011: 15). 
In accordance with the corporatist narrative, state–society relations 
are contrary to the liberal tradition whereby society and its groups 
legitimize the power of the state. Instead, it is the state that legitimizes 
and enfranchises group and individual participation in public affairs. 
As Simon Schwartzman has argued:
The ideal of a harmonious, well-regulated, non-conﬂictive society, based on 
moral principles and well-deﬁned norms which are issued and maintained by 
the public authority, the state… There should be some intragroup autonomy 
and self-regulation, but the very existence of groups and their relationships 
with each other are granted and regulated by the state… [emphasis added]. 
(Schwartzman 1977: 91) 
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In addition, David Brown has also argued that:
The essence of corporatism is the attempt to reconcile two apparently 
antithetical ideas: the image of society and the state as comprising a natural 
organic gemeinschaft community; and the image of society as an unintegrated 
aggregation of disparate groups. The two ideas are reconciled in the view of 
politics as state management… The corporatist characterization of the state 
thus implies… the state is dominated by bureaucrats and technocrats who 
are depicted as acting according to the imperatives of statehood. (Brown 
1997: 70)
These state elites are viewed as experts and professionals in their 
various ﬁelds, hence, within such a model, 'the state is perceived as 
autonomous of society, as the neutral agency seeking the stability, unity 
and development of the society through efﬁcient management' (Brown 
1997: 70). By adopting a corporatist view of state–society relations, 
communal differences are considered to be problematic as there is no 
natural communal cohesion. With no natural cohesion, society has to 
be held together and developed artiﬁcially by a strong interventionist 
state, which results in a situation whereby the state practices state-in-
duced collaboration to co-opt society's various fractious groups in order 
to achieve goals that are beneﬁcial to all (Panitch 1980; Choi 1999).  As 
former Deputy Prime Minister Wong Kan Seng once remarked: 'Social 
harmony is a valuable capital on which we can safeguard Singapore's 
future success.'4 Expressed alternatively, the narrative and form of 
governance in Singapore are premised upon an ontological reality of 
an otherwise divided populace managed by an enlightened ruling elite 
in order to achieve economic success.
Multiracialism: Corporatism's Foundation
Historical Underpinnings         
The concept of multiracialism was adopted by Singapore's political elites 
as the bedrock of Singapore's ofﬁcial multicultural policy soon after 
the nation's founding in 1965. For administrative purposes, the local 
population was classiﬁed into four groups: Chinese, Malay, Indian and 
Others (CMIO). Arguably, the adoption of multiracialism prepared the 
ground for the corporatist model to thrive. Admittedly, some observers 
have argued that while it would certainly be overly cynical to maintain 
that the Singapore government had intended to enlist race to support 
corporatism from the point of independence, there is, nevertheless, 
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evidence to suggest that the concept of multiculturalism in the form 
of multiracialism as adopted by Singapore upon independence, has 
become integral to the development of corporatism (Chua 2007, 2003; 
Brown 1997: 78).
The categorization of the local population along racial lines, the so-
called CMIO (Chinese, Malay, Indian, Other) model, is largely a remnant 
of British colonial rule when the classiﬁcation was employed for the 
purpose of census taking. It reﬂects the three major places of origin of 
immigrant groups that began to inhabit the city–state when the British 
ﬁrst set up a trading post there, namely China, the neighbouring region 
of Southeast Asia and South Asians from British India. Signiﬁcantly, the 
model ignores the intra-racial diversity found within these three con-
structed groups, and instead treats each as a more or less homogenous 
entity. The group of Chinese immigrants quickly formed the majority 
of newcomers, and by the 1960s already comprised 65 per cent of the 
population. When Singapore gained political independence, the national 
demographic distribution stood at 75 per cent ethnic Chinese, 17 per cent 
Malays, and 7 per cent Indians. The remaining 1 per cent of the popula-
tion fell under the category 'Others', which refers to individuals whose 
ethnic background was deemed incompatible with the ofﬁcial categories 
of Chinese, Malay or Indian. Eurasians and/or Jews for example, were 
included in this fourth category. As exempliﬁed by the CMIO model, the 
Singaporean approach to multiculturalism—that is, the manner in which 
Singapore understands communal differences and manages them—is 
based on the assumption that the nation's population is composed of 
individuals with only one unchanging racial identity. Strict bureaucratic 
separation of the groups through various government policies ensures 
that boundaries between the different racial categories remain intact. 
A primary instrument for this purpose has traditionally been the 
determination of a citizen's race following his/her paternal line, and 
the subsequent recording of the ascribed racial category on one's birth 
certiﬁcate and the National Registration Identity Card (NRIC). Until 
very recently, the possibility of altering the ascribed racial identity 
was very limited at best. Only in 2010 did the government introduce 
a bureaucratic compromise that permitted Singaporean children born 
to parents of different races to choose a hyphenated race option for 
their identiﬁcation papers. Nevertheless, while the practice of racial 
compartmentalization may have been liberalized somewhat, it is still 
mandatory for parents to indicate a 'prime' race for their children for 
administrative purposes.5
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Besides the preservation of the racial categories through adminis-
trative diktat, the state has also essentialized the inter-racial cultural 
identities through Singaporean multiculturalism as each race is invested 
with cultural traits, such as language and dress, unique to them. The 
simpliﬁcation of these cultural traits is striking as is the apparent as-
sumption that these examples of cultural heritage can be passed down 
through the generations and remain largely unaltered. To arrive at 
this sub-group division, racial categories were created by 'a discursive 
practice that reduces and ''homogenises'' ethnic, linguistic and religious 
differences within each category itself' (Chua 2006). Intra-racial differ-
ences within these inherently heterogeneous groups had to make way 
for a simpliﬁed commonality, thereby allowing for the construction of 
the broad CMIO categories. 
Ignoring the linguistic diversity among the group of immigrants 
that hailed from a diverse array of Chinese provinces, Mandarin was 
adopted as the common language of instruction in education and as the 
language of the national media in order to mould a homogenous racial 
category of 'Chinese'. The imposition of Mandarin was designed to unite 
and bind this segment of society, and in furtherance of this objective, it 
was decided that other Chinese languages such as Hokkien, Hakka and 
Cantonese had to be removed from the public space. A similar approach 
of enforced homogenization was adopted in reference to the other racial 
groups. For example, Malay was chosen as the single language to be 
used in public discourse to unite a diverse array of indigenous com-
munities composed of communities such as the Javanese, Minangkabau, 
Baewanese and Achehnese, under the catchall race of 'Malay'. Geog-
raphy became the deﬁning criterion for the classiﬁcation of the racial 
group 'Indian', with anyone whose ancestors originated from South 
Asia falling in this third category. Language, religion and geography 
were thus employed in varying degrees to construct distinguishable 
entities based on magniﬁed differences between the three major racial 
categories under the CMIO model.
As Singapore began to grow as a nation, additional cultural markers 
including food, dress and/or dance were introduced to further cement 
the intra-racial ties within each of these constructed categories, while 
at the same time deepening inter-racial differences. A very vivid exam-
ple of what may be referred to as the essentialization of race through 
the aforementioned three markers is the annual celebration of 'Racial 
Harmony Day' in Singapore's schools on the 21st of July. On this day, 
students are made to dress, eat and dance in the 'traditional' manner 
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of their ascribed culture in an effort to, as maintained by the Ministry 
of Education,
Remind our pupils that social division costs us dearly and that race and 
religion are potential fault-lines in Singapore society. It is a day for schools 
to reﬂect on, and celebrate our success as a harmonious nation and society 
built on a rich diversity of cultures and heritages.6
In short, through the creation of racial categories and the investment 
of the categories with 'unique' traits, an important criterion for corpo-
ratism was established. Through the CMIO model, Singaporean society 
could be portrayed as suffering from Gesellschaft disunity—there are 
inter-communal differences within the Singaporean society requiring 
a neutral agency both to bring stability and to extract the best out of a 
fractious people. 
The lynchpin role played by managed social harmony to secure 
economic progress is continually stressed by the Singaporean govern-
ment. This is of course unsurprising as the internal logic of the virtu-
ous/vicious cycle is buttressed by continued management for economic 
return. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted, 'maintaining racial and 
religious harmony and treating minorities fairly is not just the morally 
correct thing to do. It is a political, economic and even foreign policy 
imperative for our continued survival and prosperity.'7 Moreover, 'better 
understanding of each community's aspirations leads to tolerance and 
racial harmony in our society, which is a fundamental pillar of Singa-
pore's stability and consequently its economic progress.'8 
The reinforcement of racial divisions constructed by multicultural-
ism in Singapore constitutes a virtuous/vicious cycle. With the racial 
differences constructed and immutable, professional elites work self-
lessly to bring harmony between the races; the races enjoy the harmony 
brought about by such management; harmony provides the stability 
for economic growth; continued harmony and economic development 
is thus dependent upon continued management. The cycle and the 
narrative, along with everyone's place in it, cannot be recast because, 
without proper stewardship, Gesellschaft disorder will prevail over 
Gemeinschaft order.
Sustaining Multiracialism 
While corporatism's bedrock has been multiracialism, governing 
through difference, especially for political, economic and social issues, 
perpetuates the virtuous/vicious cycle by continually entrenching racial 
differences through a lived reality. Similar to social boundary making, 
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as depicted by Fredrik Barth (1969), governing through race for political, 
economic and social issues sustains the racial boundaries constructed 
by multiculturalism in Singapore as they are absorbed by the force of 
habit, repetition and ritual. As David Brown notes:
In the case of Singapore, the corporatist tendency has extended to incorporate 
the ethnic dimension to such an extent that the state elites have developed a 
marked predisposition to depict and to organize Singaporean society along 
primarily ethnic lines, even for the discussion of economic, political and 
social issues which do not relate directly to the ethnic realm of linguistic, 
religious or racial matters. (Brown 1997: 77)
Government policies in three key spheres of Singapore life aid in the 
sustenance of the corporatist narrative of governance: 1) politically, 
the institutionalization of race in the electoral process via the Group 
Representation Constituencies (GRC); 2) economically, socio-economic 
assistance is distributed through race-based lines; and 3) socially, citizens 
are encouraged through education to maintain their 'unique' cultural 
traits, while the sale of public housing is based on racial quotas. This 
management of group differences through institutional recognition of ra-
cial difference in the public sphere leaves little doubt that political elites 
in Singapore are determined to maintain the unity they have achieved 
through managed disunity in order to perpetuate the virtuous/vicious 
corporatist cycle, and everyone's place in it. Somewhat ironically, the 
government seeks legitimization largely with reference to its ability to 
successfully maintain the social harmony necessary for political stabil-
ity and economic growth despite Singaporean racial differences—even 
though it played a decisive role in magnifying, or at least constructing, 
those differences in the ﬁrst place.
With regard to the institutionalization of corporatism facilitated 
by multiculturalism through the political process, in 1988, GRCs 
were introduced to the electoral process. GRCs are multi-member 
constituencies contested by teams of candidates. In each GRC, at least 
one candidate must be from a minority race: Malay, Indian or Oth-
ers (Mutalib 2002: 665). According to Article 8A of the Parliamentary 
Elections Act (c. 218), the purpose of the GRC is 'to ensure the repre-
sentation in Parliament of Members from the Malay, Indian and other 
minority communities.' The logic of this introduction as explained by a 
Parliamentary Select Committee was that the system would 'preserve 
our fragile, multi-racial fabric' and 'entrench the multi-racial character 
of our Parliament.' 9 Within this system, the number of non-Chinese 
parliamentary seats is calibrated to be approximately 25 per cent of 
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the number of seats in Parliament, a proportional representation of 
the approximately 25 per cent non-Chinese population. 
The GRC system continues to face signiﬁcant criticism. Critics con-
demn what appears to be a substantial competitive advantage for the 
PAP as the GRC system places de facto limits on the number of constitu-
encies the opposition parties can contest in an election due to their sub-
stantially smaller candidate pool. In addition, the GRC system has also 
been described as a tool for the ruling party to safeguard its dominance 
in Parliament rather than fulﬁlling the function of securing a multira-
cial Parliament (Mutalib 2002: 665-667). The GRC system can arguably 
also be used to secure the continued corporatist model and narrative 
of governance in Singapore. It does so by ﬁrmly rooting the electoral 
process in the racial differences that have been created by multiracial-
ism. Furthermore, the system serves as a reminder for citizens of the 
racial category they belong to while also stressing how the differences 
between the races can lead to political tension if not managed well. 
Consequently, through the GRCs, the necessary communal division for 
corporatism to be practiced is sustained.
Another key tool in the institutionalization of corporatist governance 
in the economic sphere has been the establishment by the government of 
welfare organizations dedicated to the well-being of members of speciﬁc 
racial groups. The initial step in this direction was taken in 1982 with the 
creation of the Council for the Education of Muslim Children (MENDAKI). 
MENDAKI is tasked with ﬁnding solutions to major social problems in 
the Muslim community including drug abuse, teenage pregnancy and 
educational under-achievement. As almost 99 per cent of Singapore's 
ethnic Malays belong to the Muslim faith, MENDAKI is considered a 
Malay welfare organization.10 The establishment of MENDAKI signalled 
the beginning of the creation of similar organizations responsible for 
the welfare of the remaining racial groups with the Singaporean Indian 
Development Association (SINDA) and the Chinese Development As-
sistance Council (CDAC) emerging shortly thereafter. A portion of these 
organizations' ﬁnances come from the monthly contributions of its respec-
tive members, and the willingness of members to contribute to the fund 
is taken for granted. The possibility to opt-out does exist, but requires 
the individual to submit a formal written request. The existence of these 
groups further nourishes the corporatist governance model and narrative 
because through practicing a form of racialized welfare, citizens continu-
ally imbibe the government's understanding of racial divisions, thereupon 
further legitimizing corporatism and the virtuous/vicious cycle.
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Beyond the political and economic spheres, education and housing 
policies are also important elements that reinforce racial differences 
in the social sphere. While the language of instruction in Singapore's 
schools is English, the 1980s saw the introduction of the mother-tongue 
policy, which obligates each student to study a language of his/her 
ascribed race.  Chinese students learn Mandarin while their Malay 
counterparts learn Malay; recognizing the greater linguistic variation 
within South Asia, Indians learn for example, Tamil, Bengali, Gujarati, 
Hindi, Punjabi or Urdu. However, as hypothesized in Barth's theory 
on social boundary making, mother-tongue education goes beyond 
the mere learning of a language by equipping children with the tools 
to better understand their cultural 'heritage' as well. Mother-tongue 
education may therefore also be understood as an important instrument 
to produce new generations of racially sensitized citizens. A landmark 
review of education published in 1979 described the purpose of the 
mother-tongue policy as ensuring that 'no child should leave school 
after 9 years without having the ''soft-ware'' of his culture programmed 
into his subconscious.'11  
Besides education, Singapore's housing policy further ampliﬁes racial 
differences with the imposition of racial quotas in 1989 on the sale of 
public housing. The ofﬁcial justiﬁcation for racial quotas remains the 
expressed desire to prevent the emergence of racial enclaves in a country 
where approximately 83 per cent of the population live in government-
built housing estates. Thus, having created racial divisions in the public 
sphere, the Singaporean government has subsequently been forced 
to impinge upon the housing market to ensure the constructed racial 
groups do not constellate together. With the majority of Singaporeans 
living in government-built housing, even the seemingly innocuous act 
of purchasing one's home becomes an activity to remind citizens of the 
manner in which their society is organized.
Beyond the absorption of race through these various policies, the 
policies also play a further role in reinforcing the corporatist narrative. 
By implementing multicultural policies, the Singapore government is 
ironically able to bolster its position as neutral arbiter between the frac-
tious mass/mess. These policies permit the government to claim inter-
communal harmony as a product of its continued efforts, strengthening 
the government's position as harmony-maker par excellence. Moreover, 
such policies also temper the virtuous/vicious cycle and everyone's 
place and role in it. The cycle then goes as follows: elites are continually 
actively ensuring inter-communal harmony; inter-communal harmony 
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has allowed for economic progress; the masses have proﬁted from 
this harmony; and the cycle continues. Moreover, within this cycle, 
the corporatist narrative remains effectively true, unquestionable and 
believable.
Evaluating the Existing Corporatist Narrative
There is a large body of empirical, survey-based research that has 
demonstrated that feelings of Singaporean-ness are indeed very preva-
lent in the city–state, a situation that does not bode well for a system 
founded on the management of separate racial groups. One such early 
survey was the Singapore National Identity Survey (SNIS) in 1976 that 
found 90 per cent of respondents accepting the label of Singaporeans; 
88 per cent afﬁrming strongly that they are Singaporean; and 75 per 
cent preferring to be referred to as Singaporean over their race (Mac-
Dougall 1976: 514). Corroborating the ﬁndings of this early survey, a 
Ministry of Community Development and Sports (MCDS) survey on 
the Social Attitudes of Singaporeans (SAS) in 2001 found 97 per cent 
of respondents proud to be Singaporean and 98 per cent considered 
Singapore to be their home (Chan 2002: 11). Moreover, the study found 
'high endorsement of national identity generalised across the different 
demographic groups (i.e. race, religion, gender, age, education and 
household income groups)' (Chan 2002: 11). Besides the  government's 
own ﬁndings, an Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) survey of Singaporeans 
in 2002 concluded that 78 per cent of Singaporeans regarded themselves 
more as 'Singaporean'  than as 'Chinese' or 'Malay' or 'Indian' (i.e. their 
prescribed CMIO race) (Ooi, Tan and Soh  2002: 3). The survey also 
revealed that the corporatist premise of having enlightened managers 
to oversee fractious groups was becoming redundant since inter-ethnic 
relations were shown to be sturdy with 'strong progress since 1990 in 
building national identity shared by our multi-ethnic society' (Ooi, 
Tan and Soh 2002: 7). Another survey that further validated previous 
ﬁndings was conducted by the S. Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies (Chin and Vasu 2007). Titled The Ties that Bind and Blind, the 
survey found inter-racial and inter-religious relations in Singapore to 
be robust with the concepts of race and religion having little bearing on 
Singaporean interaction in the economic, security, political and social 
domains of the public sphere. Finally, in a longitudinal survey on the 
National Orientations of Singaporeans (NOS), the study ascertained 
that over the course of four surveys from 1993 through 2010, feelings 
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of Singaporean-ness remained consistently high (Tan and Koh 2010). 
In this study's latest iteration, 97 per cent of respondents were 'proud 
to be Singaporeans' (Tan and Koh 2010).
In light of the empirical evidence cited above, Singaporean commo-
nality does appear to be resilient contrary to the government's seeming 
attempt to carve racial differences into the social fabric of Singapore. 
Moreover, the shedding of racial communal differences may in fact ac-
celerate over time, due in part to the shared experience of facing large-
scale immigration into Singapore over the past 20 years. Since the late 
1980s, the Singapore government has consistently been pro-immigration 
for four main reasons: 1) the desire to expand the talent pool available 
for industry; 2) to remain competitive with other countries with deeper 
pools of cheap labour; 3) to supplement the low total fertility rate that 
is currently well below replacement levels; and 4) to maintain the racial 
demographic at the level found at independence.12 
With the world coming to Singapore to work and live, Singaporeans 
appear to be awakening to a newfound commonality among themselves 
in the face of an inﬂux of new migrants. This inter-communal bond 
generated through interaction and indeed competition with 'foreign-
ers' ampliﬁes the 'us' and 'them' dichotomy, further strengthening the 
Singaporean identity. As Janadas Devan, former associate editor of the 
Straits Times observed: 
We must take the task of integrating foreigners, 'new' Singaporeans, as 
seriously as we took racial integration or religious harmony. Indeed, the 
local–foreign divide may pose a more serious risk to our social stability now 
than racial differences. The differences within each race today—especially 
among Chinese and Indians—seem to be greater than the differences between 
the races. That is so chieﬂy because of the large inﬂow of ethnic Chinese from 
the mainland and ethnic Indians from the subcontinent into Singapore over 
the past decade or so.13
The number of immigrants entering the workforce is signiﬁcant. 
Between 2001 and 2006, there was a marked increase in numbers, from 
670,000 to 756,300, and as it stands, foreigners comprise approximately 
30 per cent of Singapore's workforce.14 All three forms of immigration–
gastarbeiter (aka blue-collar workers), permanent resident (PR) and the 
new citizen–expose Singaporeans to the 'Other', which has resulted in 
foreign/local tensions and the enhancement of Singaporean-ness. For 
example, gastarbeiter in Singapore, which is a euphemism for 'foreign 
worker', as opposed to either 'foreign talent' or 'global talent' (both of 
which refer to more highly-skilled middle and upper management 
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workers), have contributed to tensions as well as a heightened sense 
of Singaporean-ness by their presence and activities.15 For instance, 
their gatherings at and near housing estates during the weekend has 
caused conﬂicts with Singaporeans, which have on occasion resulted 
in violence.16 Residents of some housing estates have erected steel bar-
ricades around their housing block to keep workers out, while others 
have organized resident patrols to prevent loitering. The stark symbol-
ism of barricades and patrols should not be overlooked. It is clear that 
these actions are an illustration of how 'we' have to protect ourselves 
from a very different 'them'.
There is also tension between new citizens and old ones that further 
strengthens Singaporean-ness. This divide has become especially no-
ticeable within the sporting arena where foreigners are naturalized in 
order to make Singapore more competitive on the international sporting 
stage.17 Labelled the Foreign Sports Talent (FST) scheme, and introduced 
in 1993 to fast-track promising foreign athletes to Singapore citizenship, 
this scheme has been relatively successful as it has enabled Singapore 
to win its ﬁrst Olympic medals in 48 years. However, public reaction to 
this achievement has not been entirely positive, with critics lamenting 
that the athletes were not actually true-blue Singaporeans. As reported 
in the local media: 'Nowhere else [in the world], it seems, do you witness 
such disenchantment simply because the athletes bringing home the 
medals aren't native.'18 The recent 2012 Olympics in London reignited 
this debate when the women's table tennis team won two bronze medals. 
As the Straits Times reported, while China-born Feng Tian-wei's bronze 
medal was the country's ﬁrst individual Olympic medal in 52 years, 77 
per cent of those who responded to an online poll 'were ''not proud'' 
of a ''foreign import'' winning an Olympic medal.' This is despite the 
fact that Feng had been granted Singapore citizenship in 2008.19 This 
native/naturalized tension has not been limited to the international 
sporting stage. For example, in an inter-school badminton competition, 
traditional school rivalry was put aside when one school entered a team 
comprised mainly of foreigners.20 
Beyond the world of sports, the new/old citizen tension has also 
spilled over into domestic politics where fears have been expressed about 
relatively new citizens becoming ofﬁce holders in the PAP.21 Moreover, 
in the 2011 parliamentary elections, this us/them divide became a major 
issue in the election hustings. During the campaign, the PAP's organizing 
secretary, Ng Eng Hen, questioned the Singaporean-ness of Chen Show 
Mao, the Workers' Party candidate for the GRC of Aljunied, as he had 
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lived abroad for over 30 years.22 Likewise, the Workers' Party highlighted 
how Janil Puthucheary, a PAP candidate for the GRC of Pasir Ris, was a 
'new' citizen, having recently adopted Singaporean citizenship in 2008, 
and not serving what is commonly considered the sine qua non rite of 
passage of all male Singaporeans: national service.23 The tension with 
regard to these issues is very revealing. It emphasizes the presence of 
inter-communal cross-race bonds between Singaporeans fearful of the 
'Other' inﬁltrating domestic politics. 
Thus, if the empirical data is taken together with the emerging 
evidence found in the lived experience of housing, sports and politics, 
the global meeting the local has unintentionally stirred an embryonic 
Singaporean-ness that then threatens the entire virtuous/vicious cy-
cle found within the closed corporatist system. As such, experienced 
reality has drifted from the reality that the corporatist narrative seeks 
to describe, arguably making the narrative lose rationality (i.e. believ-
ability) with its audience as well as possibly eroding corporatism as a 
form of governance.
Losing Narrative Rationality 
If we concede that fabricated communal difference supports corporatist 
governance, and that corporatism can also be understood as a narrative 
of governance, the question remains whether it is possible to assess the 
narrative's credibility among the masses it requires for support. It is 
here that Fisher's narrative paradigm (Fisher 1987: 57–78), which holds 
that humans make decisions and make sense of the world through a 
narrative logic rather than a rational logic, may be employed. The differ-
ences between the two forms of logic are expressed in Table 1 (Dainton 
and Zelly 2005).
Hence, for Fisher, people are persuaded and inﬂuenced to action 
based on good reason derived from factors such as their culture, history 
and experience, and not by a 'neutral' rational form of decision making 
(Fisher 1987: 105–121). As humans make sense of the world through 
stories, rather than a strict form of rationalism, all discourse—spanning 
a scientiﬁc treatise to a religious text to a political ideology—can be 
understood, analysed and judged via a two-pronged analytic fork. To 
be judged good, believable and reasonable, a narrative has to satisfy 
the ﬁrst prong of narrative coherence and the second prong of narra-
tive ﬁdelity.
According to Fisher, narrative coherence may be understood as the 
integrity of a story's structure, or alternatively, how it 'hangs together' 
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(Fisher 1987: 47–49). In order to be coherent, a story has to possess a 
consistent story arc, there should be enough detail in the story, the 
characters have to behave in a manner considered by the audience as 
reliable and, ﬁnally, there should be no unrealistic surprises or alterna-
tive interpretations for the audience. A narrative can be judged coherent 
as individuals have had experience with other stories and thus have 
developed measurement standards over time.
The second prong of narrative validity is ﬁdelity.  Here, 'the degree 
to which a narrative is consonant with the already established pantheon 
of narratives that describe our view of the world and our place in it' is 
evaluated (Schrag 1991: 314). For Fisher, the best narratives are ones 
that fulﬁl the four dimensions of ﬁdelity where the narrative is: '1) true 
to and consistent with what we think we know and what we value; 2) 
appropriate to whatever decision is pending; 3) promising in effects 
for ourselves and others; and 4) consistent with what we believe is 
an ideal basis for conduct' (Fisher 1987: 194). In short, narratives that 
demonstrate 'the most compelling warrants for behaviour or belief, are 
those with which [individuals] most closely identify', and hence, these 
will assume a higher position in the individual's hierarchy of narratives, 
which he/she regards as meaningful (Schrag 1991: 134).
Employing Fisher's analytic fork, it is possible to assess the narra-
tive of corporatism for its believability and narrative rationality. With 
regards to the ﬁrst prong, narrative coherence, corporatism's narrative 
undoubtedly 'hangs together'. First, the plotline is consistent: there are 
Gesellschaft communities and the more harmonious Gemeinschaft variant 
with elites required to manage the former to be more like the latter. 
Second, there is enough detail to the narrative because different racial 
groups and the ruling elite are all identiﬁable. Third, all the characters 
in the story behave in a reasonable manner as history is presented to 
TABLE 1: Comparison between Rational World  
and Narrative Paradigms
The Rational World Paradigm The Narrative Paradigm
People are essentially rational People are essentially storytellers
People make decisions based on arguments People make decisions based on good reasons
The communicative situation determines the 
course of our argument
History, biography, culture, and character deter-
mine what we consider good reasons
Rationality is determined by how much we 
know and how well we argue
Narrative rationality is determined by the coher-
ence and ﬁdelity of our stories
The world is a set of logical puzzles that we 
can solve through rational analysis
The world is a set of stories from which we choose, 
and constantly re-create, our lives
Source: Dainton and Zelly, 2005: 123.
_________________________________________________________________________21
_______________________________________ Immigration and the National Narrative
show that the races did have tension that spilled over into violence in 
the 1950s and 1960s and PAP rule has resolved or at least managed 
such differences. Fourth and ﬁnally, there certainly are no unrealistic 
surprises at the end; the system coheres with empirical reality thus far, 
as harmony has prevailed and economic prosperity has by and large 
been attained.
However, with regard to the second prong of the fork, narrative 
ﬁdelity, the corporatist narrative and corporatist governance can only 
be preserved if society at large believes in the relevance and signiﬁ-
cance of this narrative, especially in the verity of its racial divisions, 
and that these divisions require elite management. Paradoxically, the 
narrative of governing through difference—predicated on the manage-
ment of ineliminable differences—is becoming defunct simply because 
those very racial differences are dissolving with the development of 
an emerging Singaporean-ness. It is this development of commonality 
between Singaporeans, despite the continued reinforcement of the so-
cial boundaries of race in daily life, which threatens the tightly woven 
internal narrative logic of corporatism and the virtuous/vicious cycle. 
In effect, reality is moving slowly away from the narrative that is trying 
to make sense of it.
Both quantitative and qualitative data presented in the previous 
section suggest that the ﬁdelity of the corporatist narrative has disin-
tegrated because the ﬁve dimensions of fact, relevance, consequence, 
consistency and the transcendent issue have all been disrupted. With 
regard to fact, the values in the corporatist narrative are called into 
question as emerging Singaporean-ness challenges the prescription 
that society is divided and requires elite neutral management. For the 
second dimension of relevance, experiencing the foreign disrupts a key 
component of the corporatist narrative where society is framed as ra-
cially divided. Tension between the foreign and the local has displaced 
tension between the races. As for consequence, Singaporean-ness erodes 
the value of having race managed in spheres such as housing, educa-
tion, politics and welfare. As for the fourth dimension of consistency, 
corporatism may be a victim of its own success. As few Singaporeans 
would have had ﬁrst-hand experience of the race riots of the 1950s 
and 1960s, corporatism's narrative is far removed from current lived 
experience. Finally, considering the ﬁfth dimension, the transcendent 
issue of corporatism as a basis for ideal conduct is fading because it 
fails to resonate with reality on the ground or offer a prescription for 
further action.
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Conclusion: Corporatism at a Crossroads
The above-mentioned data, especially the empirical studies, raise 
interesting questions when juxtaposed with the ofﬁcial government 
position on national identity. In this regard, the Singapore government 
has seemingly been eager to devalue and underrate such evidence by 
consistently emphasizing that race is a potential fault line, and that 
national identity is not well-established. In effect, this could be inter-
preted as an attempt to repair the damage done to narrative rationality 
by the changes in the makeup of Singapore's population brought about 
by liberal immigration policies as discussed previously. For instance, 
in his 2009 National Day rally speech, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
took pains to stress that 'the most visceral and dangerous fault line [for 
Singapore] is race and religion.'24 More recently, this position was reit-
erated by the then Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Zainul 
Abidin Rasheed, who maintained that 'we have witnessed a widening 
of racial and religious fault-lines…Singapore's current level of harmony 
is not a natural state…it is always a work-in-progress.'25 Such statements 
emphasizing the precariousness of inter-communal relations are often 
supported with the recounting of incidents that betray a conﬁrmatory 
bias, a situation made apparent due in part to the contradictory results 
of the surveys pertaining to race relations in the city–state.26 Overall, 
the government's position with regards to inter-communal relations is 
unsurprising, considering the corporatist system of governing through 
difference, which would abhor the awakening and expression of inter-
communal unity.
From the governing elite's point of view, if this new unity is not ad-
dressed, the corporatist narrative and system may be threatened. As such, 
in recent years, there has been a drive by the government to manage 
inter-communal unity while preserving the racial divisions required for 
corporatism. Two programs that illustrate this strategy are the estab-
lishment of Inter-Racial and Religious Conﬁdence Circles (IRCCs) and 
re-emphasizing of the National Education Programme (NE) for school 
children. IRCCs, in particular, were created in order to promote inter-
communal harmony alongside multiracialism. As noted by former Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong, 'the primary objective is to get our irrational 
fears off our chest, and get to know each other better.'27 Government 
ofﬁcials hope that IRCCs will permit religious and community leaders 
to build personal trust, increase conﬁdence and foster a mutual rapport 
that could be useful in addressing racial and religious problems on the 
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ground. Thus, IRCCs do not attempt to remove the differences created by 
multiculturalism in Singapore. Instead, it is an attempt to perpetuate the 
corporatist system by both reiterating racial divisions and emphasizing 
the need for the government as neutral arbiter of inter-racial tension.
To supplement the IRCCs, the importance of the National Education 
Programme as a tool to transmit Singaporean values across the CMIO 
categories has been given new impetus. To achieve this objective, the 
education programme has been built around the following six messages 
(Tan and Wan 2003: 5):
1. Singapore is our homeland. This is where we belong. We want to 
keep our heritage and way of life.
2. We must preserve racial and religious harmony. Though many 
races, religions, languages and cultures, we pursue one destiny.
3. We must uphold meritocracy and prevent corruption. This provides 
opportunity for all according to their ability and effort.
4. No one owes Singapore a living. We must ﬁnd our own way to 
survive and prosper.
5. We must defend Singapore. No one else is responsible for our se-
curity and well-being.
6. We have conﬁdence in the future. United, determined, and well 
prepared, we shall build a bright future for ourselves  
Similar to the IRCCs, NE maintains the corporatist structure by re-
emphasizing both racial differences and the precariousness of harmony 
(message 2) while acknowledging some form of inter-communal unity 
(message 1). Regardless, there is no attempt to remove the CMIO distinc-
tions and NE's overall thrust is the message that Singapore is racially di-
vided and government stewardship is necessary to sustain harmony.
Admittedly, these programs may appear to suggest a shift in focus 
away from earlier policies emphasizing racial distinctiveness towards 
policies that will increase civil commonality among the groups. How-
ever, while these programmes may attempt to manage solidarity, it 
is notable they do not deal with the crux of the issue: the citizenry is 
still viewed as fractious and divided and thus requires an enlightened 
ruling elite to manage it. On that account, they should not be viewed 
as an attempt to supplant either inter-racial difference or corporatism. 
The introduction of these programmes should instead be viewed as a 
strategy, carefully calibrated, to accommodate unity so as to paradoxi-
cally safeguard both racial difference and the integrity of the corporatist 
system.28 The most recent example of this balancing act may be found in 
the PAP's manifesto for the 2011 parliamentary elections. In the mani-
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festo, the ruling party pledges to 'deepen the trust among the various 
races and religions' while also strengthening 'our common identity with 
each new generation of Singaporeans'.29
Interestingly, an alternative and obvious course of action would be 
for the government to embrace the development of Singaporean-ness. 
This not as yet adopted strategy, amounting to a volte-face with regards 
to current rhetoric about the state of race relations in Singapore, could 
be a viable face-saving option. With such an approach, the government 
could both acknowledge growing Singaporean-ness, and claim it as 
a product of the government's determined efforts at nation-building. 
Consequently, as opposed to denying the presence of Singaporean-
ness, proclamations can be made that Singapore has truly become, as 
recited in the national pledge, 'one united people regardless of race and 
religion'. Unfortunately for the government, this alternative strategy 
would require tremendous policy renovation and political will. By 
accepting unity, the policies and programmes discussed above, which 
were arguably put in place to maintain corporatism, would have to be 
removed. Hence, public housing policy, education policy with regard 
to the teaching of the mother-tongue and electoral policy would have to 
be adjusted as they can no longer be justiﬁed as necessary instruments 
for inter-communal harmony. It is unclear if there is the political will 
and stamina for such an exercise.30 At present, it would appear that this 
alternative course of action continues to be unacceptable with the ofﬁcial 
position resolutely framing Singapore as 'a nation in the making... not 
a reality', while also understanding the phrase pertaining to national 
unity in the pledge as an 'aspiration'. 31 
It remains to be seen whether both the corporatist narrative and cor-
poratism as a form of governance can be perpetuated indeﬁnitely with 
the current strategy of accommodating unity to maintain difference 
and the ﬁdelity of corporatism. Nevertheless, if inter-communal unity 
continues to develop apace, the alternative option of embracing unity, 
regardless of the bureaucratic energy it will expend and the political 
cost it may entail, may become the only viable option.
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NOTES
1  The Singapore Story is a euphemism for the ofﬁcial history of Singapore.
2  The two speciﬁc communal incidents employed in the ofﬁcial historical narrative 
are the 1950 Maria Hertogh Riots and the 1964 Prophet Muhammad Birthday Riots. 
For a more detailed discussion of these incidents, see Leifer (1964) and Narayanan 
(2004).
3  For the contemporary usage in economic management, see Schmitter (1974). For the 
older conceptual use, see Wiarda (1981) and Williamson (1989). 
4  Speech by Mr Wong Kan Seng, DPM and Minister for Home Affairs, and MP for 
Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC at the 44th Bishan East National Day Dinner, 1 August 2009. 
Available from: http://www.singaporeunited.sg/cep/index.php/News-Room/
The-single-most-important-principle-in-our-approach-is-to-build-common-spaces, 
accessed 25 July 2011.
5  Vanessa Jalleh, 'Double-barrelled Race Option to take effect on Jan 1', Straits Times, 
30 December, 2010.
6  'Racial Harmony Day', Ministry of Education, Singapore. Available from: http://
www.ne.edu.sg/core_events.htm#rd, accessed 14 February 2011.
7  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'MFA Press Statement: MFA's Response to the Press 
Statement of Mr Githu Muigai, UN special rapporteur on contemporary forms of 
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, 28 April, 2010'. 
Available from: http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/
pr/2010/201004/press_20100428.printable.html?status=1, accessed 25 July 2011.
8  Statement by Mr. Saravenan Tanapal, delegate to the 65th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly on agenda item 66, on elimination of racism, racial dis-
crimination, xenophobia and related tolerance, third committee, 3 November 2010. 
Available from: http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,15399, accessed 
25 July 2011.
9  Information Division, 1988, Group Representation Constituencies: A Summary of the 
Report of the Select Committee, Singapore Ministry of Communications and Informa-
tion, p. 8.
10  As expressed by MENDAKI, its raison d'être is 'to navigate, empower and position 
the Malay/Muslim community at the forefront of excellence'. 
11 See Keng Swee Goh and the Education Study Team 1979, 'Report on the Ministry of 
Education 1978', Singapore: Ministry of Education, p. v. 
12  National Day Rally Speech (English) by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on 29 August 
2010. Available from: http://www.pmo.gov.sg/content/pmosite/mediacentre/
speechesninterviews/primeminister/2010/August/national_day_rallyspeecheng
lishbyprimeministerleehsienloongon29a.html, accessed 10 January 2011; 'Entry of 
Hongkongers won't upset Racial Mix,' Straits Times, 21 August 1989; Bellows 1990: 
203.
13  Janadas Devan, 'When in Singapore, act like a S'porean', Straits Times, 22 May 
2012.
14  Ministry of Manpower, Employment of Singapore Citizens, Permanent Residents and 
Foreigners, 1997-2006. Available from: http://www.mom.gov.sg/Publications/
mrsd_employment_SC_PR_foreigners_1997-2006.pdf, accessed 10 January 2011.
15  The Singaporean government appears undecided whether foreign middle and 
upper management immigrants should be referred to as 'foreign talent' or 'global 
talent', though both interestingly imply the converse 'local stupid'. For recent use 
of 'foreign talent', see Secretary-General of the National Trades Union Congress 
and Minister in the Prime Minister's Ofﬁce Lim Swee Say's statements in Andrea 
Tan and Shamim Adam, 'Singapore Unions Propose Foreign Talent Limits, Labor 
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Chief Says', Bloomberg, 2 June 2011. Available from: http://www.businessweek.
com/news/2011-06-02/singapore-unions-propose-foreign-talent-limits-labor-chief-
says.html, accessed 5 July 2011. For 'global talent', see International Manpower 
Division, Factsheet: Study on Relocation Practices for Incoming Global Talent to Singapore 
(Singapore: Ministry of Manpower, February 2011).
16  Tan Dawn Wei, 'The ''Them and Us'' Divide', Straits Times, 12 October 2008; Jeremy 
Au Yeong, Lynn Lee, and Keith Lin, 'Crossing the Them-and-Us Divide', Straits 
Times, 10 November 2007.
17  Chia Sue-Ann and Leslie Koh, 'New Citizens Make Up Half Our Olympic Team', 
Straits Times, 18 August 2008.
18  Tan Dawn Wei, 'The Olympic Passport', Straits Times, 24 August 2008.
19  'Immigrants and nation-building in S'pore', The Straits Times, 10 August 2012.
20  Seah Chiang Nee, 'Sports Highlight the Growing Ire', The Star Online, 13 June 
2009.
21  Li Xueying, 'New Citizens, Inﬂux of Foreigners Worry Tampines Residents', Straits 
Times, 21 February 2011.
22  Teo Cheng Wee and Robin Chan, 'PAP Salvo Targets Workers' Party ''Star'' Chen', 
Straits Times, 19 April 2011.
23  Teh Joo Lin and Cheryl Lim, 'Stand for Election? ''Ensure Male Candidates do NS 
First'',' Straits Times, 3 May 2011.
24  Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's National Day Rally Speech 2009 
on 16 August 2009. Available from: http://www.pmo.gov.sg/content/pmosite/
mediacentre/speechesninterviews/primeminister/2009/August/national_day_r
allyspeech2009part3racialreligiousharmony.html, accessed 10 January 2011.
25  Zainul Abidin Rasheed, 'Managing Social, Cultural and Religious Pluralism and 
Diversity – The Singapore Experience', 22 June 2010. Available from: http://www.
singaporeunited.sg/cep/index.php/Our-News/Managing-social-cultural-and-reli-
gious-pluralism-and-diversity-the-Singapore-experience , accessed 11 January 2011.
26  Previous issues cited include the charging of three bloggers under the Sedition Act 
for making seditious and inﬂammatory racist remarks on the internet in 2005; an 
incident where a senior civil servant revealed his Chinese mother's unwillingness to 
enter an elevator with Malays; and the tension between a Chinese and Malay family 
competing for the use of public space in a housing board estate. See Chong Chee 
Kin, 'Racist Bloggers Jailed', Straits Times, 8 October 2005; 'Forge Closer Ethnic Ties, 
Tackle Irrational Fears', Straits Times, 30 January 2002; Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong's National Day Rally Speech 2009 on 16 August 2009.
27  Cited in National Security Coordination Centre, The Fight against Terror: Singapore's 
National Security Strategy. Singapore: National Security Coordination Centre, 2004, 
p. 65.
28  Of course (as highlighted by an anonymous reviewer of this article), another option 
for the government to preserve the corporatist system would be to position itself as 
the neutral arbiter for a new social cleavage—one between Singaporeans and the 
new immigrants. This however would be a difﬁcult and dangerous strategy for the 
government: difﬁcult, as it would be hard to present itself as a neutral arbiter since 
its pro-immigration policies have led to the problem in the ﬁrst place; dangerous, as 
it may scuttle the government's pro-immigration policies since the simple response 
to the tension is to be pro-Singaporean and reduce immigration.
29  While the document also pledges to 'help new Singaporeans integrate into our society 
and contribute actively', it does not mention whether this integration and contribution 
is towards wider Singaporean society or the corporatist system. See PAP Manifesto 
2011, Securing our Future Together. Singapore: People's Action Party, p. 11.
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30  During the 2011 presidential elections, only one candidate—Tan Cheng Bock, a former 
PAP parliamentarian—appeared to perhaps recognize the end of the corporatist 
system by maintaining that Singapore has to 'go back to the drawing board, go back 
and redo the whole [multiracialism] programme again'. He argued that Singapore 
should begin by merging racial self-help groups as a 'poor Singaporean, poor Malay 
Singaporean, is the same Singaporean. We should look at it at a national level now, no 
more at a racial level'. See Andrea Ong and Leonard Lim, 'Tan Cheng Bock Pledges to 
Promote Multiracialism', Straits Times, 18 August 2011; Alicia Wong, 'Merge Ethnic-
Based Self-Help Groups: Tan Cheng Bock', Yahoo! News Singapore, 17 August 2011. 
Available from: http://sg.news.yahoo.com/blogs/singaporescene/merge-ethnic-
based-self-help-groups-tan-cheng-113752142.html, accessed 16 September 2011.
31  Elgin Toh, 'MM Lee: You Must Want to Die for Each Other', Straits Times, 21 January 
2011; May Wong, 'Govt Accountable in Actions, has Worked towards Non-discrimi-
nation', Channel NewsAsia, 19 August 2009; reproduced in United Nations Public 
Administration Network, 24 August 2009. Available from: http://www.unpan.
org/PublicAdministrationNews/tabid/115/mctl/ArticleView/ModuleID/1467/
articleId/19825/default.aspx, accessed 20 August 2013.
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